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Abstract 
Recently, mechanisms which overcome the free rider problem and achieve Pareto 
optimality under imperfect information have been constructed. In this paper we 
provide various impossibility theorems which show the difficulty of achieving 
distributional goals when consumers' tastes are unknown. The results are developed 
for a particular game theoretic solution concept, that of dominant strategy; they 
could be extended if, instead, Bayesian equilibrium were the solution concept. As 
a way out we propose a second-best approach to welfare optimization. 
I. Introduction 
Recently a solution to the free rider problem proposed by Vickrey, Clarke and 
Groves has received a great deal of attention.1 Mechanisms have been con- 
structed to elicit private information; in particular, individuals' preferences for 
public goods.2 These mechanisms use the information to optimize the welfare 
criterion corresponding to the sum of individuals' willingnesses to pay. In a 
model of public goods and a single private good (say, money) where utility 
functions are additively separable between the public and private goods and 
where all agents have the same constant marginal utility of money, this social 
objective function yields the same allocation of public goods as the Pareto 
optimum in which all individuals' utilities are given equal weight. Because our 
distribution goals may not be strictly utilitarian, however, we may be interested 
in optimizing social welfare functions (SWF) which are not simply sums of 
* This work has been supported by the Sonderforschungsbereich 21 and the National Science Foundation. 1 See, for example, Green & Laffont (1978) and Laffont (1979). 2 Economies with a single private good are considered. True tastes are elicited as dominant 
strategies in the revelation game set up by the mechanisms. 
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utilities. In particular, we may wish to consider SWF's which take account of 
an agent's ability to pay as well as his willingness to pay for a public project. 
This paper investigates the extent to which this and other distributional goals 
are attainable. The results are, for most part, negative. 
In Section II, we set up a framework in which to study these issues. Section 
III provides a general impossibility theorem which shows that under imperfect 
information no strictly concave Bergsonian SWF can be optimized. This result 
leaves us with essentially just the linear SWF's. Section IV extends this result 
to SWF's which are more general than the Bergsonian variety. It also elucidates 
the difficulties of optimizing SWF's-even linear SWF's-which incorporate 
information about abilities to pay for public projects. Section V illustrates 
comparable difficulties for the use of information which is not taste related. 
The results of this paper are developed for a particular game theoretic solu- 
tion concept-that of dominant strategies. We note in the conclusion that the 
results would all go through if, instead, Bayesian equilibrium were the solution 
concept; see Harsanyi (1968). As a way out of the pessimism of this paper, we 
propose a second-best approach to welfare optimization which we hope to 
pursue in future work. 
II. The Model 
We consider an economy with n (n> 2) consumers, indexed by i- =l, ..., n, 
and two commodities, one public and one private. The utility function of 
consumer i, u,(K, x,), is additively separable between the public good K and 
the private good x~, i = 1, ..., n, and furthermore each agent is assumed to have 
the same constant marginal utility of private good. Hence, 
ui(K, xi) = vi(K) +x.l 
The family of utility functions is further restricted by: 
0 
Assumption 1. For i= 1, ..., n let e0 be an open interval of R and let vi: R+ x 
? - R be a continuously differentiable function such that for any 0 E 0= 
ELil et, for any A= (Al, ... An) such that s=l A 1 and > 0, i = 1, ..., n, 
there exists K*(0) ER+ for which 
n n 
(i) A A,vt(K*(O), 06) = max Aivi(K, 0Q) 
i-1 KeR+ itl 
(ii) K*(O) is continuously differentiable. 
An agent is characterized by his valuation function, vj, his taste charac- 
teristic, 0O, and a vector, 7EHf, of welfare relevant characteristics other than 
1 
v,(K) is the net willingness to pay for the public good; i.e., the willingness to pay less 
the imputed cost share. 
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his tastes for the public good; i might represent, for example, endowment or 
productivity. 
The functional forms vi(., .) are assumed to be known publicly, but the true 
value Oi of the parameter Oi is known only to agent i, a priori. Similarly, Ai, 
the true value of m j, is, at the beginning, strictly private information. A mech- 
anism is a procedure where agents announce messages, on the basis of which 
a public good level is chosen. The purpose of a mechanism is to determine an 
"optimal" level of the public good. An optimal level is one which maximizes 
a given social welfare function. This paper studies the class of social welfare 
functions which can be optimized by mechanisms in which agents announce 
characteristics as messages and where revelation of true characteristics is a 
dominant strategy. A mechanism where agents announce characteristics (not 
necessarily their true characteristics) as strategies is a revelation mechanism. 
A mechanism is formally defined as a mapping, ff=(d, t), from the strategy 
o 
spaces ni=L Hf x fl"i ef into R+ x Rn, composed of a decision function, d( ), 
o 
with range R+ and a n-tuple of transfer functions, t(-)= =[tl(), ..., tn(. )], each 
with range R. d(.) associates to any 2n-tuple of announced parameters a 
quantity of public good, while ti(.) associates a transfer of private good to 
agent i, i=l,..., n. 
A revelation mechanism is said to be Ca when the function /f() is con- 
tinuously differentiable. 
A revelation mechanism, f( ) = [d(.), t(.)] is said to be strongly individually 
incentive compatible (s.i.i.c.) if the truth is dominant strategy for each consumer, 
that is, if, for any i, any (q, 0) EJI=L H, x Hn-I=L Ej, and any (A, Oj) EH? x i 
Vf(d{i(' , , Of_), 0 O + , J, 6_.)i,) +t
> v,(d(,, -,, 0,, 0_,), 0i) +ti(O,, 0_6, rl7,, V-,) 
where 
0-i (0*1, 0i-1, 0+,' **... On) 
and 
-i = (1l ***. i1, -l' i+x , ,rn) 
A social welfare function is a real valued function F of [v1(K, 61),..., Vn(K, 6n), 
ti", , tn' 91 ... I On, 71 > 1n]n 
We say that a social welfare function F is implementable if there exists a 
s.i.i.c. mechanism whose outcome maximizes F when everyone tells the truth. 
From Green & Laffont (1978), we know that the social welfare functions 
2- 1 Aifv(K, 6f) where the weights A, (21 Ai = 1, Ai >O, i = 1, ..., n) are con- 
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stants, are implementable by the following obvious generalization of the Groves 
mechanisms: 
n 
d(O) maximizes ~ A2v((K, Of) in K 
i?l 
ti(0)=- v,(d(O), 0,) 
III. Bergsonian Social Welfare Functions 
By a Bergsonian SWF, we mean a real-valued function of v1, ..., v,, tl, ..., tn. 
This is actually a more general formulation than the usual definition, which 
makes F a function only of v. + tl, ..., vn + tn. We shall demonstrate that strictly 
concave F's are not implementable. 
We adopt the following assumptions. 
Assumption 2. F is twice continuously differentiable and its matrix of second 
order partial derivatives with respect to the vi's is negative definite. Further- 
more aF/9vi >0 for all i. 
To prove an impossibility theorem, we can work with a small set of valua- 
tion functions, since any superset will then lead to impossibility a fortiori. 
Consider the class VQ of valuation function n-tuples consisting of functions 
which are quadratic with constant term: 
K2 K2 VQ= {OK--+OC **..., OnK-~ + onj,OE 
o2 
- Oi,c = (aL1, ... a cn) ERn KeR+} 
= {v1(K, 01, o), ..., vn(K, 0,, c an)j0E,  cER", KER}, 
where E) is a bounded open interval of the positive real line. 
Assumption 3. YO(0 E, VcERn, there exists a unique continuously differentiable 
K*(0, oc) which maximizes F(v1(K, 01, oc1), ..., vn(K, 0,,, n), t(0, a), ..., t,,(0, c)). 
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 2 and 3, there exists no implementable Bergsonian 
SWF. 
Proof. We first parameterize vi by rewriting it as 
K2 
Vi = OiK-- + flg 8 + yf, where O, fp, y fER 
The class of valuation functions {vj} is the same as the class {v5} so that 
nothing substantive has changed. Take 
Ot = (6a, yE), 
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Suppose that F is a Bergsonian SWF satisfying Assumptions 2 and 3 and 
which is implemented by the mechanism (K*(0), tl, ..., tn). Agent i's maximiza- 
tion problem is 
max vi(K*(O), O6) + t(O). 
The first-order condition in 0t is 
as- (0) -=-K (K*(O), Ij) as,* 
Evaluated at the truth, 60 = 0, the second-order condition in 6O is: 
-a"0,(K*(O,, 0_,), j,) (, 0_,) <O. (l 
Since K* maximizes F, - e= 0 when K= K*. 
Differentiating this last condition with respect to a0 and solving for aK*/SO, 
we obtain 
aF 32V n a 8 2 af at7 a2F t8 
OK* avf KMo .=1 AKSvjvf . aK avStS (2 
Sn F a2v S_r a 2F av 
1= _Vj r s 4l= a K2 aK aKvr av., aK 
Let D{(O) be the denominator of the right-hand side of (2). Using the quadra- 
tic specification of the valuation functions, (1) can be rewritten as: 
tG ,(O, ?-o_)+H ,(6, o_-i) < o, 
where 
O^(6M,-O.~) = D fOr, v,) 
Sat aF [naa2F O2F t r, 
o= + (Vo- . S,v, S K Kv S +ct, J o 
Di(Oi, O_,) 
Now choose 0 E 6? so that, for some t, u {1,..., n}, at :u. Then because the 
matrix of second partials (S2F/Iv,Ov,) is non-singular, the numerator of G0(0) 
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does not vanish for some i. For such i, choose f ER such that fl,Gj(O~, 0_) + 
Hi(O, 0_-i) >0. 
Select y9 ER so that 7j +f?iO =7i +?fl0. This implies that iG fiO , pi, 0_) + 
H(i{,f, i' , 0-_) >0. So second-order conditions are violated at (60, fi, ~y, 0_,), 
and, therefore, incentive compatibility cannot hold. Q.E.D. 
IV. More General Social Welfare Functions 
Theorem 1 demonstrates that if the family of possible valuation functions is 
large enough to include the quadratic class, one cannot implement Bergson 
SWF's which are strictly concave. This goes a long way toward ruling out 
non-linear SWF's. We next investigate the implementability of more general 
SWF's. That is, we shall consider SWF's which depend directly on the taste 
parameters 0. The results, however, are not much more positive than those 
for Bergson SWF's. 
Consider again the class VQ of quadratic valuation functions with constant 
terms. Let F be a real valued function of v1, ..., vn, t,, t..., I , 6 ... 1 X, a, 
K, where (vl, ..., vn) E VQ. 
Assumption 2'. F is twice continuously differentiable, and the matrices 
(s2F/avcvj) and (a2F/ac9av,j) are negative definite. Furthermore 9F/avi>0 
for all i. 
Assumption 3'. VO 06, Voc R", there exists a unique, continuously differenti- 
able K*(O, a) which maximizes F(vl(K, 01, a), ..., v,(K, O, x), t, ..., tn, 01 ..., 
On, ?1, ... ocn, K). 
Theorem 2. No SWF satisfying Assumptions 2' and 3' is implementable. 
Proof. Almost identical to the proof of Theorem 1. 
Theorem 2 is a strongly negative result but still does not bear on a large 
class of potentially implementable SWF's; viz., those that are linear in the 
valuation functions. For example, suppose the class of valuation functions is 
quadratic: OiK-(K2/2), O0>0. Then the second order conditions for imple- 
mentability becomes 
O (0) > 0 V 0Vi. (4) 
If (4) holds for K*, then any SWF for which K* is maximizing is implement- 
able. In particular the following two-person SWF is implementable for vx and 
v2 quadratic: 
F =02 v(K, 01) +01v2(K, 02). 
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The maximizing K for this SWF is 
K*Q(0) 20102 K 
O1+ 02' 
the fact that (OK*/aOS)= (202/(01+02))2>0 implies implementability. 
The transfer functions of the implementing mechanism are of the form 
t1(0) = 201 02(02- 01) d0 + h1(02) 
[20:,(0,- 0 
t2(0) = (r 20201 - 02) dO2 + h2(01) (5) (0J V1+ 02 3 
It may easily be verified that this mechanism is not of the Clarke-Groves 
variety. That is, the transfers are not chosen so as to make the individual and 
social maximands coincide. 
This example should not, however, make us too sanguine about the pos- 
sibility of implementability in the linear case. From Robert's paper in Laffont 
(1979), we know that if the class of valuation functions is entirely unrestricted, 
then only the SWF's of the form A v , where the A i's are constants, can be 
implemented. 
This suggests a general result: the larger the class of valuation functions is, 
the less freedom one has to have the weights depend on the taste parameters. 
The conjectured result is illustrated by the following example. 
Consider the SWF Y'i Ai(0O)vt(K, 0i) in the quadratic case. K* is defined by 




2 Ai(0j) 0 
K*(O) -=l 
j=1 
AK* _ (A) [A6(0i) + 0 A;(0f)] - (2 ) A (0) (6) 
a0, ((2)2 
sign - = sign A2 A I1 + (0 - ,)] 
Suppose that A'/Ai +0. When the range of 0O is small enough, condition (4) 
is satisfied. However, when this range increases, sign SK*I/00 becomes negative 
for some values of 0, showing that as the class expands the SWF of the type 
chosen here becomes non-implementable. 
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As we noted in the introduction, one question of particular interest is whether 
it is possible to implement SWF's that take account of an individual's ability 
(rather than desire) to pay for a public good. Taking account of abilities is a 
simple matter if these are known; one can simply arrange lump-sum transfers 
accordingly. Eliciting this information may be difficult, however, as the fol- 
lowing argument suggests. Suppose that agent i's preferences can be re- 
presented by the utility function vi(K, 0) +A(f) ti, where A( ) is a known 
function of the publicly unknown characteristic 77,. Taking the private good 
as numeraire, Ai is the marginal utility of money. One might interpret j as 
marketable endowments (whether in human or physical form). Ai is presumably 
lower the more richly endowed is i and is, therefore, a useful index of ability 
to pay. From Theorem 2, we know there is little point in considering SWF's 
which are strictly concave functions of the v1's; so consider SWF's of the form 
n 
J-1 
where < >0 for allj. 
Assumption 4. i and ~ are strictly positive, continuously differentiable func- 
tions for all i and there is a unique twice continuously differentiable function 
K*(0, ,) such that K=K*(O, tq) maximizes Inli Oj(y,)vj(K, 0j). 
Assumption 5. 
2v, (K*(O, x), 0,) + 0 V0, r. 
Theorem 3. Under Assumptions 1,4, and 5,anSWFof theform E I i#(n1)vi(K, 0) 
is implementable if and only if 
where A is a positive constant. 
Proof. Maximizing ,j #j(W,)vj(K, Oj) leads to the first-order condition. 
24(vj) a (K*(0, ),0) )=0 (7) 
Differentiating (7), we obtain 
K* q a- K a AK* v 8 0%i 
*82 , and aO --= (8) 
&an d 2 J Vo om2i1 
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Incentive compatibility implies the identities 
8t 
_ 
1 vS aK* 
80 Ai AK 8a0i 
8t 
_ 
1 av aK* 
since the first-order conditions must be satisfied for any 0-_ and any true 
parameters. 
Using the fact that 82td/(o0Qaq7) must equal 82ti/(aq870) (Young's theorem), 
we obtain 
aA: 
I av 8SK* -8_22v K* 
a SQ 5K5015Q (9) At 8K 80t a K89 80 ' 
Using (8) and invoking Assumption 5, we can reduce (9) to 
OV_ = 
or 
It remains only to check the second-order conditions. Since vt(K, 0Q) is 
strictly concave in K, the matrix of second-order derivatives of agent i's 
objective function is negative semi-definite, implying pseudo-concavity. Thus 
the first-order conditions suffice. Q.E.D. 
Theorem 3 is a decidedly negative result for those who are equity minded. 
It states, in effect, that the only implementable SWF's which take into ac- 
count ability to pay are those which weight richer agents more heavily than 
poorer. 
V. On the Use of Non-Taste-related Information 
Theorem 3 is discouraging as to the possibility of using information about 
endowments. As we formulated preferences, however, endowments entered the 
agent's utility function through his marginal utility of income. A natural 
inquiry is to ask whether characteristics which do not affect utility at all 
(but still may be relevant to social welfare) may be incorporated by an imple- 
mentable SWF. Unfortunately, the answer is, once again, no, as we shall now 
demonstrate. In view of Theorem 1, we can immediately exclude SWF's which 
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are strictly concave functions of the vi's. Therefore, consider a linear SWF of 
the form: 
F= i(Oi) v,(K, O0) (10) 
where , =(,h, ..., j,), and ?m is a non-taste-related characteristic of individual i. 
Assumption 6. Let V be a class of utility functions such that for all CL-decision 
functions, d(t, 0) for which 
n n 
tj(@) v,(d(?,, 0), 0,) = max 2 At(,) vt(K, 0), 
K>O 1=1 
-d (27,O,)t+ 0 and 02V, (d(n, 0), 0,) : 0 
ani OKaO0 
for each i and almost any (?7, 0). 
The condition d9d/tO~:+O guarantees that the optimal public decision is 
genuinely dependent on the parameters m, while a2vj1(bKa0) ?0 ensures that 
the decision depends on the 0t's. Assumption 6, therefore, serves only to rule 
out uninteresting cases. 
Theorem 4. If a class of valuation functions satisfies Assumptions 1 and 6, then 
if a SWF F on V satisfies (10), F is not implementable. 
Proof. Consider the maximization program of an agent i faced with a C1- 
mechanism, /(.)-=(d(-), t(.)). 
max vi(d(r7, 0), O) + ti(n, 0) 
The first-order conditions of this program are: 
~,(~, 0) + ,(,0=o 
at' ad ata 
a-~ (d(., o),qjOi 
0 
,)'(v -(7, 
o ) + (,(, 
o ) = o 
In order for the true values (0~, O) to be dominant strategies, the above 
conditions must hold as identities when evaluated at the truthful point. Thus, 
cot, (q, O) -- &(d(vq, 0), 0,).-d0 m O) K Zam 
atr , avLd Oad(0) 
- ) v'K(d(V, 0), 0). a0 
The equality of the cross derivatives of ti(,q, 0) implies 
a20V ad(O)0 
aK a0i ami 
which is impossible from Assumption 6. Q.E.D. 
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VI. Conclusions 
This paper demonstrates that, even for highly restricted domains of prefer- 
ences, the possibilities of implementing SWF's other than a weighted sum 
(with constant weights) of marginal rates of substitution between public and 
private goods are highly limited. In particular, SWF's which incorporate 
elicited information about ability to pay rather than willingness to pay for a 
public good appear impossible, in general, to implement. 
Throughout, the solution concept we have imposed for implementing mech- 
anisms is that of dominant strategies. One avenue for attaining more optimistic 
results would seem to be to weaken the solution concept. As we argued else- 
where,1 Bayesian equilibrium2 does not generally permit a wider range of 
SWF's to be implemented than does the dominant strategy equilibrium. In- 
deed, the four theorems of this paper all go through when Bayesian equilibrium 
become the solution concept. 
Alternatively, one might adopt Nash equilibrium as the solution concept. 
More work needs to be done to determine the possibilities in this case. Maskin 
(1977) has shown that any social welfare function satisfying the properties of 
monotonicity and no veto power can be implemented by a Nash mechanism. 
On the other hand, Roberts3 has shown that when valuation functions are un- 
restricted and the social welfare function has a unique optimum, it can be 
Nash-implemented only if it is dominant-strategy-implementable. 
An alternative direction, which we hope to explore in future work, is second- 
best optimization. The results of this paper show that only a limited class of 
social welfare functions may be implemented. If a SWF of interest falls outside 
this class, one can "partially" implement it by optimizing instead the imple- 
mentable SWF which best approximates it (in an expected welfare sense). 
Obviously, the worse the approximation, the more partial the implementation. 
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